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Family Feud: A Response to Robert
Weisberg on Law and Literature
Richard H. Weisberg
While linked, despite our last names, to no other common ancestor than
Adam (for whom he begrudges me my admiration), Robert Weisberg and
I agree on so many aspects of Law and Literature theory that we may be
said to have familial ties of the interdisciplinary kind. Like my namesake,
I have studied literature to the ultimate degree; like him, I have taught the
subject to undergraduates and graduate students in literature. So neither
of us, as does the occasional upstart, comes to this multifaceted relation
anxious only to spew out recently digested (and hence often bilious) mat-
ter, usually projected towards others' dust.
Nor in discussing (as henceforth) "Weisberg's work," "Weisberg's ap-
proach," etc., can I wholly avoid the sense of self-critique or mirror-
watching that must earlier have affected those near namesakes Fiss and
Fish in their famous disputations. Like Fish to constitutional theory,
Weisberg brings to a kind of settled discourse (a decade of Law and Liter-
ature writings) insights otherwise overlooked by the field's practitioners,
yet does so with an enthusiasm that barely masks his sympathies for that
discourse.
Still, Weisberg creates here a skeptical persona. Fearful particularly of
what he ubiquitously calls "sentimentality"-a word used at least 20
times in this relatively short article-Weisberg seeks to distance himself
from enthusiasts for the fledgling field who may have falsely inferred its
universal significance. This fear and trembling before the seemingly pow-
erless sister narrative discipline of literature speaks volumes, and helps
explain why so many legal academicians without Weisberg's literary
training recoil at the "very idea of law and literature" (John Ayer's titu-
lar phrase in a self-revealing recent essay in the Michigan Law Review).
In addition to flagging the dreaded "sentimentality" issue (of which
more later), Weisberg displays an antipathy for ornament that leads him
to say strange things about Cardozo and Blackstone, among others, and to
ignore the teachings of the neo-realist master, Karl Llewellyn. These two
Leitmotifs ally Weisberg with the non-literary legal professoriat, but they
seem out of sync with many of his other positions. So, too, does a spotty
reliance upon at least one plank of our generation's mandatory
postmodernist platform: a distrust of all absolutes, and a sense that a suc-
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cessful or obvious attack on one "foundationalism" necessarily disposes of
all. But here, Weisberg's clear attraction to structuralism and distaste for
systems grounded (like that of the gentle deconstructionist, James Boyd
White) in their appreciation for complexity alone, eases the jarring disso-
nance among various voices he assumes.
Indeed, Weisberg vs. Weisberg becomes Weisberg to the nth power,
when he asserts that this interdisciplinary movement must establish its
"subversive" bona fides. I concur. Neither discipline will emerge re-
freshed and redirected unless Law and Literature points out and exempli-
fies the iconoclastic spirit in which both narrative projects must now be
approached. But this is true not as an abstract statement about interdisci-
plinary incursions on law (otherwise, what has Law and Economics added
that was not already set out in Holmes, Learned Hand, and even the
series of cases marked "Unreasonable Risk" in the Prosser Casebook of
1967?); the need for discomfiture arises because, as Weisberg puts it, "the
supposedly different forms of discourse in a culture are linked at some
level in symbiosis or conspiracy." 1 Put directly: if Law and Economics
grabbed center stage for restating as a comforting absolute what most
judges had common-sensically always known, Law and Literature will
emerge by calling into question the basic assumptions of our central dis-
cursive cultures and at the same time by pointing towards a more overt
and ethical use of institutional language.
Here, as in other domains, however, Weisberg strikes me as right for
the wrong reasons. First, he misperceives the phenomenology of this sub-
versive interrelation. Like some Critical Legal Studies people, and like
Clifford Geertz (whom he cites), Weisberg seems to feel that a "recon-
struction of the standard explanation of behavior 'sits rather poorly with
traditional humanistic pieties' "; but this is only true for periods in which
established beliefs are breaking down for reasons other than intellectually
disquieting attacks upon them. When the Pope. has to say, as he did re-
cently when visiting Waldheim in Austria, that "[it would be unjust and
not truthful to charge Christianity with these unspeakable crimes [of the
Holocaust]," it does not take a law review article to bring down conven-
tional structures. Law, literature and religion are already in stress; the
aptness of Law and Literature must be defined in terms of subversion
only because, in our generation, the predominant institutions of narrative
discourse have already perceived their own degradation. The "pieties" are
disappearing under their own (truly "sentimental") flabbiness; the acute
interdisciplinarian follows, rather than leads, cultural phenomena. Thus,
1. Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 Yale J.L. & Humanities 1, 51 (1988)
[hereinafter Robert].
2. Id. at 4.
3. John Paul Meets with Austrian Jews, New York Times, June 25, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
[Vol. 1: 69
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incidentally, the "Hey, look at me!" iconoclasm of other recent movements
in law has not attracted Law and Literature scholars.
Yet the reporter of bad tidings (and the identifier of different, more just
discursive systems) must be an interdisciplinarian, precisely because the
traditional disciplines, almost by definition, will be the last to locate and
articulate a set of beliefs that runs the slightest risk of leading to their
dissolution. Hence Weisberg's apparent unwillingness to locate the source
of this subversion within the literary text itself. (He almost seems willing
to accept Richard Posner's curious claim that the modern novel's fascina-
tion with legal procedures may be dismissed as "adventitious," although
he contradicts himself in his fine discussion of Kafka.) Weisberg resists,
paradoxically, the view that-like literature in its recent relationship to
philosophy-law may fruitfully turn to a sister set of texts in order to
understand its own fatal limits. We do not "produce" a conceptual
wrench;" we identify its pre-existing locus.
To return now to Weisberg's fear of "sentimentality," I believe it arises
from his underlying resistance to the literary text itself more even than to
those Law and Literature thinkers who seem self-congratulatory or smug.
This resistance appears on two levels, one normative and one epistemic.
The former involves the accurate assertion that some (repeat, some) Law
and Literature work seems designed primarily to bring the lawyer back in
touch with his or her emotional (as opposed to, say, rhetorical or ethical)
side. Against this tendency, Weisberg constantly posits a normative asser-
tion, typified in these repetitive phrases: "this identification through liter-
ature of human voices and sensibilities in legal proceedings is not or
should not be a matter of any great discovery; . . . this point. . . hardly
should require recurrence to the great works of the Humanities. ...
Lawyers or law students are or should be perfectly aware even from con-
ventional case analysis that human pain underlies doctrinal abstrac-
tion. . . .To say that we need to read works of imaginative literature to
see this point is odd. It should be unnecessary. . ...5
Now no one in the field today would disagree with the claim that those
who emphasize through literary texts the emotional and irrational aspects
of law should not have to do so. But this normative claim is of little
analytical value. Literary criticism performed carefully and knowledge-
ably by law professors with a modicum of training not only can but
must-at least in 1988-fill a near void of pedagogical and scholarly in-
terest in the irrational side of human behavior. (Weisberg implicitly con-
cedes, as his paper progresses, that literature is a privileged place for
knowledge of the irrational, superior-as Nietzsche first observed in his
remarks about Dostoevski-to the newer "sciences" of psychology or soci-
4. Robert at 4.
5. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
19881
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ology. The claim is particularly valid for lawyers, because the demonstra-
tion of irrationality in literature is constantly linked to narrative acts,
either the author's or the characters'. Where, as in so many modern
novels, law itself is a pervasive, overt theme, the literary linkage of irra-
tionality to legal discourse becomes a unique source of learning for law-
yers.) There exists no other locus of learning about such central legal irra-
tionalities as the "otherness" of many clients (The Stranger); the
subjective bases of seemingly objective institutional acts (The Merchant of
Venice, Billy Budd, Sailor, The Brothers Karamazov); the tactical impor-
tance of illogical behavior such as silences, physical gestures or deliberate
departures from linear reasoning (Crime and Punishment, Great Expec-
tations); the dangers of legalistic over-analysis and abstraction in the face
of the obvious (The Fall and a non-novelistic precursor, Hamlet); the
phenomenology of thinking itself as resulting from sensory, rather than
logical, factors, and the ensuing relationship of thinking to the expression
of the thought (The Floating Opera).
We must teach and think about these texts because, here and now, they
are the best medium to instruct ourselves and our students about what we
do. I need not dispute Weisberg's claims that to suggest we must read
fiction implies that lawyers are "doltish"' or that some of these elements
are picked up by osmosis from occasional casebook analyses or in practice
(all of his examples, however, relate to litigation experience). If we are
"doltish," we are no more so than our peers. But we need this learning in
order to practice and (more importantly, at least for me) in order to un-
derstand what our assumptions are and what we do.
Weisberg's normative claim seems naive in two other ways. First, he
ignores the work of Allan Bloom, E.D. Hirsh and others, work that sug-
gests that people today do not learn, much less take with them "fully
absorbed"7 the lessons of literature. My nephew is about to graduate from
the University of Pennsylvania and tells me that only my influence (and
no requirement) led him to study formally any fiction whatsoever in earn-
ing his B.A. Lawyers themselves, as I note elsewhere,' had-until this
movement made some strides-gone beyond apathy to actual aversion
when it came to reading fiction. A residue of unsupported skepticism re-
mains even, as I have been observing, in Weisberg's sophisticated and
largely sympathetic paper.
Second, Weisberg fallaciously equates (somewhat along the lines of
Walter Gellhorn in a 1982 number of the Journal of Legal Education)
literary sensitivity to softness. That bias emerges particularly (and ironi-
cally) in Weisberg's attack on Cardozo. Annoyed by Cardozo's use of or-
6. Id. at 18.
7. Id.
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nament, but apparently accepting the rhetorical aptness of so many of his
opinions, Weisberg declares:
As a first cut, we can generally align linguistic precision with sensi-
tivity to moral value, and abstraction to the opposite. But this is not
a compellingly necessary alignment. It . . ignores the possibility, at
least on different facts, of highly poetic descriptions of conflicts that
create sentimentally congratulatory pictures of ancient rights of
property.'
This straw man will not walk. Admirers of Cardozo always (and until the
present moment1") point to Palsgraf as one of many cases in which lin-
guistic precision and ornament produce justice (in terms of efficiency and
morality) in favor of a corporate right of property. We disagree with John
Noonan (as does Weisberg) that Cardozo becomes evil every time he finds
against an injured plaintiff or a criminal defendant. Yet the rhetorical gift
remains constant. Weisberg inverts the theoretical construct; we move
from admiration of Cardozo's ethics to a gradual awareness of how his
rhetoric serves those values.11 Furthermore, I find (also to my surprise)
that Weisberg dislikes my treatment of Rehnquist, even though that treat-
ment not only provides the discursive linkage he otherwise seeks12 but also
because it precisely raises the question of how clever and even eloquent
rhetoric can lead to unjust results.
The Law and Literature task here is to revivify the lawyer's grasp of
rhetoric, but then to undertake the highly difficult task of associating an
esthetic or technical tool like rhetoric with a moral and abstract realm,
which is ethics. Once again, here, the literary text is the central medium
of learning (despite Weisberg's unproven assertion that "modern literature
. . . has little to do generically with formal rhetoric"-how could it not?,
see, e.g., Camus's The Fall), for it imposes the esthetics-ethics discussion
upon the reader. No wonder that Posner desperately labels the modem
novel as "adventitiously" about law while still approving the renewal of
interest in stylistics. He does not want to study the underlying link be-
tween rhetoric and values. But Weisberg does, so his discussion in IIIA
and IIIB, and his rejection of Cardozo, seems very odd.
Ornament belongs with law. It is an element of legal rightness, and it
can also be (as with the Rehnquist opinion I examined) a factor in legal
wrongness. Even the neo-realists, at their most literary moments, recog-
nized this. Hence, Llewellyn:
Thus the only esthetic rule which I recognize about adornment in
9. Robert at 38.
10. See my Judicial Discretion, or the Self on the Shelf, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 105, 108 (1988).
11. See my Law, Literature and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, I Cardozo L. Rev. 283 (1979).
12. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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relation to function is that adornment is best where it can be made to
serve function, and is bad when it interferes with function; beyond
that, the quest for richness of beauty and meaning seems to me a
right quest. You may call these prejudices; to me, they are considered
values. But whether you like them or not, in general, you will have
difficulty in dodging their applicability to things of law."
Only an obstinate set of unexamined presuppositions would oppose orna-
ment just because it is ornament, and I do not believe Weisberg exhibits
that obstinacy. Yet, again, there is skepticism in the face of what Llewel-
lyn (now speaking directly of Cardozo) calls the "light-giving answer."
Our ponderous age finds the economic "graphic" more re-assuring than
the literary flash of insight; but judgment cannot be so systematized.
"Sentimentality" is thus partly revealed as a set of beliefs held (or duti-
fully represented) by Weisberg and not necessarily to be found in much
Law and Literature discourse. I return to the "epistemic" level of resis-
tance to our work that I mentioned earlier. Weisberg makes at least two
claims about knowledge, one of which I find unconvincing and the other
extremely helpful. He generally seems to feel that a proposition-however
general-is disproven by any single example that tends to work against it.
Thus the Law and Literature belief that the literary voice is the best con-
temporary jurisprudential source would be undermined by the very cor-
rect observation (through the work of Regenia Gagnier and others) that
some literary voices are themselves corrupt. 4 Or the related, and ex-
tremely well crafted, section on T.S. Eliot, employed by Weisberg to
"prove" that a "Ciceronian unity of ethics, politics, and aesthetics . ..
points us toward a world that we cannot have or should not want. ' ' 5
But these assertions, unless they exist in a purely linear frame that
utterly denies both choice and the cyclical nature of knowledge, do not
disprove the generalizations asserted by Law and Literature. Our task, of
course, is to choose the texts that proffer (often only covertly) the subver-
sive voice we find representative of the age. We begin our study of the
modern law-related novel with Flaubert and Dostoevski rather than with
Balzac and Dickens, and we do so because the former integrate narrative
ambiguity and non-omniscience with the anti-rationalistic and word-skep-
tical themes they so brilliantly produce. We continue with Melville and
Camus because, again, the manner of communication exhibited in their
narratives about law subtly reflects their iconoclasm about the seemingly
logical, irrefutable nature of legal discourse. Among modern writers con-
tinuing the thematic and structural fascination for law, we make choices
as between E.L. Doctorow, for example, who is in the tradition just dis-
13. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 236 (1941).
14. Robert at 22.
15. Id. at 12.
[Vol. 1: 69
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cussed and, say, Louis Auchincloss, whose self-satisfaction emerges from
every word he writes.
So, on the larger level, I might first question whether the Ciceronian
unity Weisberg dislikes is inevitably beyond our reach. Do ethics and es-
thetics join only at the beginning of cultures, as they did in our nation's
first half-century? Then how can we explain the force, beauty and dura-
bility of the Napoleonic Codes (1804-08), which still guide numerous le-
gal systems and which Stendhal read every night for their sheer (Llewel-
lyn-like) esthetic power? Those, no more than the Mosaic codes, were the
product merely of simpler, hopelessly anterior cultural conditions. To rea-
son that our present legal environment is too individualistic to allow for
the merger may be acceptable; but such reasoning does not prove anything
as a teleological matter.
Nor does Weisberg seem to me to prove that we should fear such a
Ciceronian renaissance. The apostrophe to Eliot only indicates that our
(neo-classical, not romantic!1 ) search for a unity of ethics and esthetics
requires us to move beyond postmodernist relativism and to name
(Adamically) those values that we support and those that we reject. The
Fascistic ordering, so rightly raised and rebutted by Weisberg, is not the
sole ordering by which a newly classical culture might define itself.
Postmodernism's peculiar fallacy-to reject epistemology because this cen-
tury's most horrifying events emerged from an absolutist system-distracts
us from thinking about totally different (i.e. just) systems and forces us to
disjoin the word from the referent precisely when we most need their
reunification.
One absolutist system's rottenness, in other words, does not prove the
corruption of all absolutes. I think Weisberg realizes this, and his excel-
lent discussion of structuralism (see, e.g., footnotes 175-178) indicates an
uneasiness with postmodernist non-referentiality. The literary text, again,
is the locus for understanding not only the yearning for absolutes in most
people (understood and implemented, it seems to me, by Law and Eco-
nomics theorists) but also the kinds of absolutist systems to embrace or
reject. When the Grand Inquisitor discards Jesus, Dostoevski indicates not
that all systems are bad, but more precisely that any system that must
reject goodness in order to operate on earth is irredeemably corrupt. Other
Dostoevskian, law-related texts take the hint and indicate clearly1" which
16. Posner's assertion that I am a "romantic" makes sense only in light of Weisberg's brilliant
debunking of the Judge's "maturity" theme. I will respond to Posner's claims in my forthcoming
review of his book, in the Stanford Law Review (July 1989).
17. Clarity, of course, is a relative concept. Towards the end of his IIIB, Weisberg seems to
suggest (through Bentham) that legal rhetoric would be better if people eschewed metaphor and just
said what they meant. Although his point is far from clear, I might answer by suggesting that most
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systems indeed do merge earthly order and spiritual goodness to arrive at
a workable norm of terrestrial justice (see, e.g. Malamud's The Fixer).
As I have suggested, however, Weisberg raises the more helpful, herme-
neutical question of why literature alone (or even best) becomes a contem-
porary source of understanding. Here he tracks the argument of Edward
L. Rubin in a very recent Michigan Law Review piece.18 Admitting, as
Weisberg does, that legal scholarship needs to become more self-critical
and aware of its own inherent values, Rubin uses hermeneutics (one of
Law and Literature's contributions to recent legal discussion) to indicate
that a "broader vision of interpretation" is required, and that
the idea that scholars should approach legal texts armed with a set of
literary techniques is . . . the antithesis of modern hermeneutics.
Rather, the scholar's task is to relate the text to the totality of our
historical and cultural experience. Questions about the political func-
tion of the text, its historical setting, and its practical effects, are as
relevant as the judge's use of legal reasoning. Hermeneutics, in other
words, is a theory of understanding that applies to the entire range
of issues raised in standard legal scholarship. It seems fair to say that
it refuses to treat literature as literature, in the belles-lettres sense,
and it certainly would not recommend that legal decisions be treated
in that fashion.'
Following Gadamer to some extent, but resisting his allegiance to text,
Rubin (in the same vein as Weisberg in Part III) raises the point that
literary theory itself might deny the notion that literature is particularly
relevant to law. The point gains credibility when one notices that literary
"theoreticians" not only never discuss individual literary texts, but delight
in "confessing" that they have not even read the central fictional narra-
tives of our culture. I agree with Weisberg that the "interpretation" de-
bate has yielded little, but again I think the Weisberg-Rubin conclusion is
right for the wrong reasons. Indeed, it is precisely the programmatic dele-
tion of literary texts from the recent debates that has so impoverished
them.
In Gadamer's sense, the "wider text" for understanding law needs to be
literary, at least at this juncture, because most of the inquiries itemized by
Rubin gain focus only within those texts. Weisberg is absolutely right,
therefore, in suggesting early in his paper that the Law in/Law as Litera-
ture dichotomy no longer needs to hold sway.' We learn about meaning
best not from theoretical sources but instead from those very narratives
that form the heart of 19th and 20th century fiction. The hermeneutic
18. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1835, 1877
(1988).
19. Id.
20. Robert at 4.
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tradition that counsels the widest arena for epistemological inquiry, and
the keenest ability to criticize our interpretive stance as we are seeking
understanding and meaning, urges us in this moment of our "thrown-
ness" to approach literary art. As I have discussed elsewhere,"1 the "great
books" that so delight in depicting legal procedures set forth a hermeneu-
tics that is fully responsive to our postmodernist concerns without ac-
cepting at all a postmodernist approach to meaning. A reader, sequen-
tially, of Crime and Punishment, The Brothers Karamazov, Billy Budd,
The Stranger, and The Fixer (the primary "procedural novels," as I have
called them) will be uniquely situated not only to understand legal inter-
pretation but also to challenge the assumptions that interpreters such as
legal academics bring to their enterprise.
Law in literature and law as literature have been unified, just as es-
thetics and ethics yearn constantly for unity. Ours is the task, in my opin-
ion through what Rubin calls "belles lettres," to make the choices that
distinguish unities one from the other, and that bring us to a Weisberg-
Weisbergian fusion of these "supposedly different forms of discourse."
21. Robert Weisberg discusses these essays at 33-34, nn. 113 & 114.
19881
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